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For many years Turkey and Greece – the only coastal states on the Aegean Sea –
have argued about the breadth of their maritime zones. The unique situation in the
Aegean Sea has already provided for disagreements concerning the right to exploit
resources on the continental shelf of the Greek islands that were brought to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1978 (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf). At the
time, the Court did not render a decision on the merits due to a lack of jurisdiction. In
September 2020, the situation nearly escalated when a Turkish warship collided with
a Greek frigate (see here).
New potential for conflict arose on January 20th, 2021 when the Greek parliament
nearly unanimously passed a law that extends the breadth of Greece’s territorial
waters in the Ionian Sea (towards Italy) from 6 nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm (see
here and here). Further, Athens has reserved its right to increase the breadth of its
territorial waters in the Aegean Sea (towards Turkey) (see here and here). In light of
the political implications these competing claims in the Aegean Sea hold (see here,
here and here), this piece addresses what such a move from Greece would entail in
legal terms and how it relates to the ongoing dispute between both States regarding
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.
Territorial waters under the international law of the sea
Irrespective of their long-lasting dispute, Greece and Turkey have not concluded
any agreement to address the problem. Bilateral treaties exist between Turkey and
Libya and between Greece and Egypt, each regulating the maritime zones of the
contracting states to the detriment of the respective other states. These agreements,
however, have no legal effect on Greece and Turkey because international
agreements must not harm nor benefit third party states without their consent (pacta-
tertiis-rule). Under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up
to a limit not exceeding 12 nm measured from the coastal baselines.
Although Turkey is not party to UNCLOS and argued that it was not bound by its
provisions, it is well established that this 12 nm rule reflects customary international
law (Territorial and Maritime Dispute, para. 177). Still, the breadth of the territorial
sea can also be less than 12 nm; since the rule does not apply ipso iure, a state
needs to declare the breadth of its territorial sea.
In this context, one conceivable argument for Turkey could be that there is a differing
rule of regional customary law in the Aegean Sea. For this argument to hold, Turkey
would need to prove that Greece restricted its territorial sea to 6 nm because it
considered itself legally bound to do so (state practice and opinio juris). While Greek
practice on the extent of its territorial claims in the Aegean Sea has been consistent
for the past 85 years, determining opinio juris is more problematic.
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In UNCLOS, the breadth of the territorial sea was uniformly set to 12 nm without
constraints on particularly enclosed bordering states (which was an addition that
Turkey tried to introduce during UNCLOS III negotiations, see here). Greece
ratified UNCLOS without any reservation to this regulation. The absence of a Greek
reservation in this regard indicates that Greece does not generally consider itself
bound by any limitation beyond the 12 nm rule in the Aegean Sea. Further,in a 1936
law, Greece set the extent of its territorial sea at 6 nm. Lastly, Greece has repeatedly
declared that it reserves its right to establish a 12 nm territorial sea (see here and
here). Bearing the burden of proof, Turkey will need to establish that Greece’s
adoption of a 6 nm territorial sea does not merely stem from diplomatic goodwill or
political courtesy but is a legally relevant action.
Without any such indication, Greece, given that no rule of UNCLOS or customary
law impedes a coastal state from changing the breadth of its territorial sea, is
allowed to extend its territorial sea to 12 nm both in the Ionian Sea and in the
Aegean Sea.
A one-sided result
In addition to the mainland, Greece consists of many islands in the Aegean Sea.
Pursuant to Art. 121 UNCLOS, which codifies customary law (Maritime Delimitation,
para. 185), the provisions concerning the territorial sea are applicable to islands
as well. The territorial sea of an island is determined in accordance with the law
applicable to land territory, i.e. the mainland.
In other words, Greek islands have their own territorial sea that can extend up to 12
nm. Pursuant to the customary equidistance rule in Article 15 UNCLOS (Maritime
Delimitation, para. 176), the territorial waters of two coastal states opposite or
adjacent to each other must not extend beyond the median line of every point
equidistant to the baselines of the respective coastal states. If it adopts a 12 nm
territorial sea, Greece essentially relocates the median line towards Turkey’s border
and thereby reduces Turkey’s territorial sea and its overall influence in the Aegean
Sea.
Due to the extension of the Greek islands, this would result in 71 percent of the
Aegean Sea being in possession of Greece. In contrast, with a territorial sea of 6
nm, only 21 percent pertain to Greece (see here, here and here). This also means
that, in accordance with Art. 2 (1) and (2) UNCLOS (also customary international
law, Nicaragua, para. 212), these waters as well as the air space above fall under
Greece’s full sovereignty. Thus, Turkey’s rights in these areas are restricted to the
right of innocent passage (Art. 17 ff. UNCLOS) not including the right to overflight.
Under international law, Greek claims to a 12 nm territorial zone in the Aegean Sea
are therefore valid.
Having a right does not equal exercising a right
On the law, the Greek position concerning the territorial zone in the Aegean may be
stronger (see also here), but this dispute is not the only unresolved matter between
Turkey and Greece. The delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of both states remains unclear. Unlike the delimitation of
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territorial sea, the latter is not clearly regulated. According to customary international
law, enshrined in Art. 74 UNCLOS (Territorial and Maritime Dispute, para. 139),
the basis for delimitation of the EEZ with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
based on agreement between disputing states, the aim being an equitable solution.
For the case that such an agreement does not exist, UNCLOS merely refers
to its own dispute settlement mechanisms (Art. 279 ff. UNCLOS) which is not
customary law and thus, not binding on Turkey. The same applies to control over
the continental shelf, which consists of the seabed and the subsoil throughout
the natural prolongation of the land territory (Art. 83 UNCLOS, Libyan/Maltese
Continental Shelf, para. 77).
The result is that there is no common and generally accepted method under
customary international law to determine the limits of the continental shelf or the
EEZ for states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Until the disputing parties reach an
agreement on the delimitation (or submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of a judicial
or arbitral body), there is no legal certainty as to what extent the states can exploit
resources or conduct marine scientific research in these maritime zones. Since
the underlying principle for such an agreement is the principle of equity, Turkey’s
position concerning the continental shelf is far stronger than concerning the territorial
sea (see here).
In conclusion, insisting on the 12 nm territorial sea in the Aegean Sea – as it is
lawfully entitled to do under customary international law – Greece could shatter
its basis for negotiations with Turkey relating to the continental shelf and the EEZ,
where the legal positions are much less clear. Therefore, although it is a question of
law whether Greece could extend its territorial sea to 12 nm, whether it should do so
is also a matter of diplomatic relations.
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